Consistent beliefs in extensive form games

We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Barelli, Paulo
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336. - Vol. 1.2010, 4, p. 415-421
Publisher:	Basel : MDPI
Subject:	obesity \| hierarchies of conditional beliefs \| epistemic conditions \| common belief \| correlated subgame perfect equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g1040415 [DOI] 74955701X [GVK] hdl:10419/98489 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369353