Consistent demands for coalition formation in NTU games

In a sequential bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff M division players form demands for their participation in a coalition. These M demands have some appealing, intuitive features. We characterize the sets of M semi-stable and stable demands vectors for general NTU games using M consistency requirements which relate the demands formed in the initial game M with demands formed by subgroups considering their outside options.

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Year of publication:	1990-05
Authors:	Moldovanu, Benny ; Winter, Eyal
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	Bargaining model \| Game theory \| NTU games

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Series:	Discussion Paper Serie B.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	14 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028350