-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games

We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.

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Year of publication:	1998-08-31
Authors:	Lehrer, Ehud ; Sorin, Sylvain
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 27.1998, 2, p. 231-244
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375588