Constructing a Conventional Antitrust Case Against Google

Because services offered by some of the so-called “FAANG” big-tech firms—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google—are free, many believe we need a basis other than the “consumer welfare” standard in antitrust. At least with respect to Google, this conflict is false. Having a “zero price” for search may rationalize rather than impede an antitrust case. Suppose that Google has to set a price at zero for search, the service it most clearly dominates—and not just chooses to as a two-sided platform provider—because of the cost it would incur from having to collect money from users and exclude those who do not pay. If so, a case against Google could be similar to the case prosecuted against AT&T in the 1980s. This rationale would not apply to other FAANG firms, because they either do charge positive prices or likely could