Consulting collusive experts
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mookherjee, Dilip ; Motta, Alberto ; Tsumagari, Masatoshi |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 122.2020, p. 290-317
|
Subject: | Collusion | Delegation | Expert | Mechanism design | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Kartell | Cartel | Experten | Experts | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Unternehmensberatung | Consultancy services | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership |
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