Consumer misperception of eco-labels, green market structure and welfare

How does consumer misperception of competing eco-labels affect environmental and economic efficiency of eco-labels? This article provides a theoretical insight into this issue by using a double-differentiation model, where three products are potentially in competition: an unlabeled product and two eco-labeled products of medium and high environmental qualities (with distinct labels). We compare the case of perfect information, where consumers can perfectly assess the environmental quality of the three products, and the case of imperfect information, where consumers cannot fully assess the environmental quality associated with each label while perceiving all eco-labels as a sign of high environmental quality and each label as a particular variety of a product. We show that consumer confusion can affect the market structure by weakening the firm that provides the greenest product. Paradoxically, consumer misperception is not always detrimental to social welfare because, when th e perceived quality of both eco-labeled products is relatively high, it can improve the quality of the environment and raise global profits and consumer surplus. Moreover, although firms would harmonize their demanding eco-labeling criteria if they face full-informed consumers, they turn to greenwashing when they know the way the consumers form their belief on environmental quality. Finally, we show that an NGO faced with consumer misperception will require less stringent standard than in the perfect information case, while conclusions on the regulator eco-labeling strategy are not clear-cut.