Contest for power in organizations

This paper explains the provision of private rent to powerful members in an organization as an outcome of a contest for power that raises the total contributions to the organization. A necessary condition for a socially efficient contest scheme with reimbursements is characterized.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Gregor, Martin
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 114.2012, 3, p. 280-283
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Contest \| Reimbursement \| Rent-seeking \| Collective good

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572149