Contest with pre-contest investment

In a standard noisy contest, more competition (more contestants) leads to lower individual equilibrium effort. We show that when contestants can make pre-contest investment to enhance their competency, neither equilibrium investment nor individual effort is monotonic in the number of contestants. Individual effort may increase with the level of participation.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Fu, Qiang ; Lu, Jingfeng
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 103.2009, 3, p. 142-145
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Contest Pre-contest investment Preemptive incentive Shortlisting Effort supply

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023528