Contingent capital makes credit crunches less likely : but do banks want to have it?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Crummenerl, Marc ; Heldt, Klaus ; Koziol, Christian |
Published in: |
Review of managerial science. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1863-6683, ZDB-ID 2296460-5. - Vol. 8.2014, 2, p. 175-196
|
Subject: | Capital structure | Bank regulation | Loan granting | Credit crunch | Contingent capital | Bankenregulierung | Kapitalstruktur | Kreditrationierung | Credit rationing | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Basler Akkord | Basel Accord | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Bilanzstrukturmanagement | Asset-liability management | Kreditrisiko | Credit risk | Kredit | Credit |
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