Contingent Capital Securities: Problems and Solutions

We describe some recent contingent capital securities (CoCos) and explore the issues that confront their development. We take the view that bank CoCos should be designed to maintain confidence in a bank before a crisis begins because once a crisis commences it is difficult to see how a bank can assure the capital market without the support of state aid. With this overriding objective in mind we find that, in at least some respects, existing examples of bank CoCos have got the ‘right’ design. Existing bank CoCos are unfunded as they should be as there is no need to structure these securities to provide additional liquidity. If funding turns out to be necessary then a liquidity crisis is already underway and the CoCo has already failed in its attempt to maintain confidence in the bank. Moreover, existing CoCos use the simpler single trigger that we favour rather than dual trigger structure recommended by some.