Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
Year of publication: |
2016
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Authors: | Cella, Michela ; Etro, Federico |
Published in: |
Journal of economics. - Wien [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0931-8658, ZDB-ID 635037-9. - Vol. 118.2016, 3, p. 193-218
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Subject: | Oligopoly | Screening | Two way distortion | Incentives | Investments | Oligopol | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Schock | Shock | Hierarchie | Hierarchy | Wettbewerb | Competition | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Investition | Investment | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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