Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation.

In settings where the Revelation Principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision-making, and at best achieve the same level of performance.This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Melamad, N. ; Mookherjee, D. ; Reichelstein, S.
Institutions:	Industry Studies Program (ISP), Department of Economics
Subject:	CONTRACTS \| ENTERPRISES \| MANAGEMENT

More details

Series:	Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	34 pages
Classification:	K10 - Basic Areas of Law. General ; K12 - Contract Law ; L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General ; L20 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005780709