Contract design by service providers with private effort
Year of publication: |
June 2018
|
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Authors: | Zhang, Hao ; Kong, Guangwen ; Rajagopalan, Sampath |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 64.2018, 6, p. 2672-2689
|
Subject: | hidden effort | service operations | service contracts | information asymmetry | pricing | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Dienstleistungsqualität | Service quality | Privatisierung | Privatization | Outsourcing | Dienstleistungsmanagement | Service management |
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