Contract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Choi, Albert H. ; Triantis, George G. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Vertrag | Contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (34 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Journal of Legal Studies Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 16, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3330973 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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