Contract prolongation in innovation production as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard
Thomas Ziesemer
| Year of publication: |
2001
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ziesemer, Thomas |
| Publisher: |
Maastricht : MERIT |
| Subject: | Wissenschaftler | Scientists | Freie Mitarbeiter | Freelancers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Niederlande | Netherlands |
| Extent: | 15 S |
|---|---|
| Series: | MERIT-Infonomics research memorandum series. - Maastricht, ZDB-ID 2186977-7. - Vol. 2001-037 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Literaturverz. S. 13 - 14 |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001636774