Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences : an experimental study
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Hoppe, Eva I. ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 80.2013, 4, p. 1516-1544
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Subject: | Agency theory | Adverse selection | Information gathering | Ultimatum game | Social preferences | Experiment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Adverse Selektion | Ultimatumspiel | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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