Contracting with controllable risk
Christopher S. Armstrong, Stephen A. Glaeser, Sterling Huang
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher ; Glaeser, Stephen A. ; Huang, Sterling |
| Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 97.2022, 4, p. 27-50
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| Subject: | executive compensation | contract design | equity incentives | risk-taking incentives | stock options | derivatives | hedging | natural experiment | risk management | controllable risk | Aktienoption | Stock option | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Hedging | Derivat | Derivative | Risiko | Risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.2308/TAR-2018-0265 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013384350