Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality : when does one size fit all?
Felipe Balmaceda
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Balmaceda M., Felipe |
| Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 2, p. 601-637
|
| Subject: | Moral hazard | Adverse selection | Limited liability | Monotonicity | Optimal mechanism | Moral Hazard | Adverse Selektion | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00182-019-00700-5 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591697