Contracts for healthcare referral services : coordination via outcome-based penalty contracts
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Adida, Elodie ; Bravo, Fernanda |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 3, p. 1322-1341
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Subject: | healthcare | B2B | contracts | fee-for-service | pay-for-performance | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Gesundheitsversorgung | Health care | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Gesundheitswesen | Health care system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Dienstleistungsqualität | Service quality | B-to-B-Marketing | Business-to-business marketing | Krankenhaus | Hospital |
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