Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fu, Hui ; Yang, Jun ; An, Yunbi |
Published in: |
Small business economics : an entrepreneurship journal. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0921-898X, ZDB-ID 1024560-1. - Vol. 53.2019, 1, p. 129-144
|
Subject: | Optimal contract | Venture capital | Double-sided moral hazard | Bargaining game | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Risikokapital | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Investition | Investment |
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