Contracts versus communication
Year of publication: |
07 November 2021
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Authors: | Blume, Andreas ; Deimen, Inga ; Inoue, Sean |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Contractual incompleteness | communication | cheap talk | language constraints | authority allocation | Kommunikation | Communication | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Sprache | Language | Vertrag | Contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Interne Kommunikation | Internal communication | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten) |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ISSN 2045-6573, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP16697 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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