Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation.

This paper examines whether historical ealth distributions can affect long run output and distribution despite rational saving behavior and absence of any technological nonconvexities or externalities. We consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Mookherjee, D. ; Ray, D.
Institutions:	Institute for Economic Development, Department of Economics
Subject:	POVERTY \| CREDIT \| SAVINGS \| BEHAVIOUR

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Series:	Boston University - Institute for Economic Development.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	D31 - Personal Income, Wealth and Their Distributions ; D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving ; I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty ; O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements ; Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245468