Cover Image

Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
Year of publication:
2011-02
Authors: Csóka, Péter ; Herings, Jean-Jacques P. ; Kóczy Á., László ; Pintér, Miklós
Publisher: Elsevier
Subject: Mathematics | Econometrics
Full text |
Type of publication: Article
Notes:
Csóka, Péter and Herings, Jean-Jacques P. and Kóczy Á., László and Pintér, Miklós (2011) Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility. European Journal of Operational Research, 209 (1). pp. 57-62. ISSN 0377-2217
Source:
BASE
Similar items by subject
Similar items by person