Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011-11
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University
Subject:	Contests \| rent seeking \| public good \| easy-riding

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2011-28 26 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861926