Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) where all players act independently; and (ii) where the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime. .

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S ; Mealem, Yosef
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 1, p. 624-638
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Contests \| rent seeking \| public good \| easy-riding

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	H4 - Publicly Provided Goods ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645717