Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

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Year of publication:	2001-02
Authors:	Oechssler, Jörg
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	cooperation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	6 pages long
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989619