Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Chander, Parkash ; Tulkens, Henry |
Published in: |
The design of climate policy. - Cambridge, Mass. : MIT, ISBN 0-262-07302-1. - 2008, p. 165-186
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Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Selbstverpflichtung | Voluntary agreement |
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