Cooperation under punishment : imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help

Sven Fischer; Kristoffel Grechenig; Nicolas Meier

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We find that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to significantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself. -- public goods ; cooperation ; centralized punishment ; imperfect information ; decentralized punishment ; peer to peer punishment

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Fischer, Sven ; Grechenig, Kristoffel ; Meier, Nicolas
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Strafe \| Punishment \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Experiment \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (26 S.) Ill., graph. Darst.
Series:	Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2172002-2. - Vol. 2013/6
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/84987 [Handle]
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723557