Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains

Online-Ressource (XIV, 167p. 20 illus., 10 illus. in color, digital)

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 644

Literaturverz. S. 155 - 167

Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory; 2.1 History of Game Theory; 2.2 Basics in Cooperative Game Theory; 2.2.1 A Cooperative Game; 2.2.2 Properties of Cooperative Games; 2.2.3 Variants and Fundamental Applications of the Classical Cooperative Game; 2.2.4 Interval-Valued Games; 2.3 Allocating Cooperative Costs; 2.3.1 Motivation and Classification of Allocation Methods; 2.3.2 Properties of Cost Allocations; 2.3.3 Non-Game-Theoretical Cost Allocation Methods

2.3.4 The Core2.3.5 Additive Core Variants; 2.3.6 Multiplicative Core Variants; 2.3.7 The Subcoalition-Perfect Core; 2.3.8 The Interval Core; 2.3.9 The Shapley Value; 2.3.10 Conclusions; Chapter 3 Algorithmic Game Theory; 3.1 Literature; 3.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations; 3.3 Theoretical Background; 3.4 Including Fairness Criteria; 3.5 Computing Core Variants; 3.6 Computing Interval Core Elements; 3.7 Conclusions; Chapter 4 Cooperation in Supply Chains; 4.1 Horizontal versus Vertical Cooperation; 4.2 Supply Chain Games in the Literature; Chapter 5 An Economic Lot Sizing Game

5.1 Cooperative Ordering Situations5.1.1 The Underlying Problem; 5.1.2 Properties of the ELS Game; 5.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the ELS Game; 5.2.1 The Row Generation Procedure; 5.2.2 A Numerical Example; 5.3 Computational Study for the ELS Game; 5.4 Extensions for the ELS Game; Chapter 6 A Lot Sizing Game with Uncertain Demand; 6.1 The Underlying Problem; 6.2 Special Phenomena of Interval Cores; 6.3 A New Definition of the Interval Core and Its Computation; 6.4 Computational Study for the Interval ELS Game

Chapter 7 A Capacitated Lot Sizing Game with Transshipments, Scarce Capacities, and Player-Dependent Cost Coefficients7.1 Cooperative Production Situations; 7.1.1 The Underlying Problem; 7.1.2 The CLSP Game; 7.1.3 Properties of the CLSP Game; 7.2 Solving the Cooperative CLSP; 7.2.1 A Lagrangean Relaxation Based Heuristic; 7.2.2 A Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic; 7.3 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the CLSP Game; 7.3.1 The Row Generation Procedure; 7.3.2 Computing the Subcoalition-Perfect Core; 7.3.3 Computing the Minmax Core; 7.4 Computational Study for the CLSP Game

7.4.1 Computational Study: Lagrangean RelaxationBased Heuristic7.4.2 Computational Study: Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic; 7.4.3 Computational Study: Subcoalition-Perfect Core; 7.4.4 Computational Study: Minmax Core; 7.5 Extensions for the CLSP Game; Chapter 8 A Multilevel Lot Sizing Game with Restricted Cooperation; 8.1 Cooperative Supply Situations; 8.1.1 The Underlying Problem; 8.1.2 Games with Restricted Cooperation; 8.1.3 Properties of the MLCLSP Game; 8.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the MLCLSP Game; 8.2.1 The Row Generation Procedure; 8.2.2 A Numerical Example

8.2.3 Computing Core Variants

10.1007/978-3-642-13725-9 [DOI]

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