- Abstract
- Zusammenfassung
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Subjective Transformation of Games After Prior Experiences (TAP Games)
- 2.1 Transformation and common knowledge
- 2.2 Aggregation
- 2.3 Social Projection
- 2.4 TAP Games
- 3. Analysis of Battle Of The Sexes
- 3.1 Equilibrium Forecasts for the TAP Game
- 3.2 Experimental Implementation
- 3.3 Experimental Findings
- 4. Analysis of Simultaneous Market Entry
- 4.1 Equilibrium Forecasts
- 4.2 Experimental Implementation
- 4.3 Experimental Findings
- 5. Discussion and Implications
- 5.1 Does prospect theory’s value function generalize to games?
- 5.2 Gender Effects
- 5.3 Prior Evidence on Mixed Strategy Play and Mental Accounting
- 5.4 Focal points and fairness as alternative explanations?
- 5.5 Implications and Future Research
- Literature
- Appendix A: Fundamentals
- Appendix B: Equilibrium Selection in the Bos Game
- Appendix C: Equilibrium Point Selection in the Me Game
- Appendix D: Solution Criteria, Measurement of Mixed Strategies
- Appendix E: Instructions for the Battle of the Sexes (BOS) Game
- Appendix F: Game Instructions for the Market Entry (ME) Game:
- About the Authors
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302578