Coordination with communication under oath
| Year of publication: |
September 2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Jacquemet, Nicolas ; Luchini, Stéphane ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Zylbersztejn, Adam |
| Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 1386451-8. - Vol. 21.2018, 3, p. 627-649
|
| Subject: | Coordination game | Cheap talk communication | Oath | Kommunikation | Communication | Koordination | Coordination | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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