Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy.

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Year of publication:	2003-11-01
Authors:	McLean, Richard ; Postlewaite, Andrew
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Subject:	Core \| Asymmetric Information \| Incentive Compatibility \| Exchange Economy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	PIER Working Paper Archive.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	23 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109608