Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ausubel, Lawrence M. ; Baranov, Oleg |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 1, p. 251-273
|
Subject: | Core-selecting auction | Combinatorial auction | Vickrey auction | VCG mechanism | Spectrum auction | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Auktion | Auction | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mobilkommunikation | Mobile communications |
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