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Core, Value and Equilibria for Market Games: On a Problem of Aumann and Shapley.

In this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shapley (1974) is presented. A sufficient condition for the Aumann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancedness and theta-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative games are proven.
Year of publication:
1996
Authors: Butnariu, Dan ; Klement, Erich Peter
Published in:
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 25.1996, 2, p. 149-60
Publisher: Springer
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Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755726
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