Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

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Year of publication:	2006-12
Authors:	Forges, Françoise
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Théorie des jeux \| Analyse bayésienne

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Theory and Decision, 2006, Vol. 61, no. 4. pp. 329-344.Length: 15 pages
Classification:	C11 - Bayesian Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074172