Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents: comment
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Krähmer, Daniel ; Strausz, Roland |
Other Persons: | Parreiras, Sérgio O. (reviewed) |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 146.2011, 5, p. 2159-2164
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Signalling | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Ökonomische Rente | Economic rent | Theorie | Theory |
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