Corruption and the Rate of Temptation : Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?

This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Van Rijckeghem, Caroline ; Weder, Beatrice
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Korruption \| Corruption \| Öffentlicher Dienst \| Civil service \| Vergütungssystem im öffentlichen Dienst \| Public sector pay \| Theorie \| Theory \| Effizienzlohn \| Efficiency wages
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 1997 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	J38 - Public Policy ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets ; O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070422