Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

We present a model of parallel redistribution system to explain the problem of corruption. Within this model we synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are central to solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from corrupt behavior. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behavior and lead to general prosperity. Both problems can be explained and solved within theory of redistribution systems and its part theory of parallel redistribution games