Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.

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Year of publication:	2005-03-01
Authors:	Ellis, Christopher J. ; Dincer, Oguzhan C. ; Waddell, Glenn R.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Oregon
Subject:	Corruption \| decentralization \| yardstick competition \| spatial autoregression

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	2 pages long
Classification:	H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H29 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593738