Corruption driven by imitative behavior

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Accinelli, Elvio ; Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 1, p. 84-87
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Corrupt behavior \| Evolutionary dynamics \| Imitative behavior \| Institutions and operations

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; P37 - Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041604