Corruption in union leadership

This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as close as possible to the workers’ reservation wage. The analysis leads to some interesting results which are important for anticorruption policy formulation.

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Year of publication:	2014-01-20
Authors:	Chaudhuri, Sarbajit ; Ghosh Dastidar, Krishnendu
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Corruption \| Union \| Firms

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	O1 - Economic Development ; O16 - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment ; O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261141