Costly information acquisition and delegation to a liberal central banker

This paper studies an extension of Rogoff (1985) where the central banker can choose how much effort to exert and thereby learn about a supply shock. With this assumption, it is not necessarily optimal for society to delegate to a .conservative. banker. This may explain why such delegation often is a politically controversial issue.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Lagerlöf, Johan
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; FS IV 99-18
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/50936 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278030