Costly verification of cost performance and the competition for incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dunne, Stephanie A. |
Other Persons: | Loewenstein, Mark A. (contributor) |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 26.1995, 4, p. 690-703
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Produktionskosten | Production costs | Theorie | Theory |
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