Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs?
Restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions. Forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity-based runs. Even when a run does not occur, welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset.
| Year of publication: |
2010
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Peck, James ; Shell, Karl |
| Published in: |
Journal of Monetary Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932. - Vol. 57.2010, 4, p. 420-427
|
| Publisher: |
Elsevier |
| Keywords: | Bank runs Bank stability Deposit contracts Glass-Steagall banking Mechanism design Portfolio restrictions Sunspot equilibrium |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs
Peck, James, (2003)
-
The market game: existence and structure of equilibrium
Peck, James, (1992)
-
Market Uncertainty: Correlated and Sunspot Equilibria in Imperfectly Competitive Economies.
Peck, James, (1991)
- More ...