Credibility May Require Discretion, Not Rules

We reexamine the common argument that rules produce greater credibility than discretion. Rules limit the actions of agents, restricting observations of the agents' preferences or types. In a second-best world, where rules cannot be everlasting, a regime of discretion in some periods may produce superior credibility and dominate a regime of rules. Keyword(s): Rules, Discretion, Credibility, Regulation

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Cowen, Tyler ; Glazer, Amihai ; Zajc, Katarina
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Glaubwürdigkeit \| Credibility \| Theorie \| Theory \| Regelbindung versus Diskretion \| Rules versus discretion
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76, No. 2, May 2000 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140602