Credible signals: A refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibria
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Streb, Jorge M. |
| Publisher: |
Buenos Aires : Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA) |
| Subject: | perfect Bayesian equilibrium | refinement | signals | credible deviations | self-selection condition |
| Series: | |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Other identifiers: | 1680031864 [GVK] hdl:10419/238326 [Handle] |
| Classification: | D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
| Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012609504