Credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on-the-job search

This note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, renegotiation does not require mutual consent. If the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation, wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bartolucci, Cristian
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 3, p. 657-659
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Credible threats \| On-the-job search \| Wage renegotiation

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594169