This paper solves an empirically parameterised model of life-cycle consumption which extends the precautionary savings models of Carroll (1997), and Deaton (1991), to allow for uncollaterized borrowing and default. In case households choose to default: (i) their access to credit markets is restricted; (ii) lenders of funds may seize their financial assets above an exemption level, and up to the amount of outstanding debt; and (iii) there is a ¶stigma e.ect,¶ or a decrease in current utility caused by the social embarrassment of declaring bankruptcy.The model shows that the decisions to borrow and default are closely related to the shape of the life-cycle labor income profile, and henceforth vary across household education levels. Moreover, the model explains two puzzling empirical facts: (a) why bankruptcy rates have been growing in periods of economic expansion and low unemployment; and, (b) why households hold simultaneously high cost debt and low return assets.
