Creditors' holdup, releveraging and the setting of private appropriation in a control contract between shareholders
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | La Bruslerie, Hubert de ; Gueguen, Simon |
Published in: |
International review of law and economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188, ZDB-ID 704902-X. - Vol. 68.2021, p. 1-16
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Subject: | Controlling shareholder | Corporate governance | Creditors' holdup | Debt leverage | Private benefits | Releveraging | Corporate Governance | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Theorie | Theory | Gläubiger | Creditors | Vertrag | Contract | Privatisierung | Privatization | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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