Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees
We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Hardy, Daniel C. ; Nieto, Maria J. |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial Stability. - Elsevier, ISSN 1572-3089. - Vol. 7.2011, 3, p. 155-164
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Deposit guarantees Bank supervision Cross-border coordination EU |
Saved in:
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